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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR mE EASTER,\/ DISTRICT OF VIRGINLA
(Alexandria Division)

ROSETTA STONE LTD.
Plaintiff,
v.

: CMLACTION NO. I:09cv736
: (GBLlTCB)

GOGGLE r1'ic.
Derendant

GOOGLE lNC.'S OBJECnONS TO EVIDENCE A1',1) MOnON TO STJm<E

6486

Google lnc. ("Google"), hereby objects to certain documents and testimony att2ched to
the declara:rions submitted by Rosetta Stone in support of its M2TCh 26, 20 10 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to Liability (Dkt. No. 103). For. the reasons set forth below, Google
requests that the Court strike this purpoited evidence from the record end preclude it from the
Coun's consideration of the parties' motions.

1.

Declaration of Jason Calhoun in Support Google

of Rosetta Stone Ltd.'s Motion for Partial
Surrunary

Judgment

("Calhoun Dec!. "),

~1

as

to

objects

declaration

lacks

Mr.

Calhoun's

foundation,

constirutes

that

Liability

hears4Y. is irrelevant, and is argumentative.

2, 3 (sentences 5,

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Fed. R. Evid. 401,

6), 4- (sentences 1) 2), 5 (:sentences I, 2), 6 402, 403, 602; See Coleman v. Loudoun
(last sentence), 7 (sentence 5), 8-1!.

County School 3d., 294 Fed. Appx. 778, i82

(4th Cir. 2008) (statements that are "selfserving, unsubstantiated

o~inions"

cannot

defezt a motion ior summary judgment); see
also U.S.

Y.

Roane, 378 F. 3d 382, 400-40 I

(4th Cif. 2004) (Such "airy generaliiies,

conciusory assertions and hearsay statements
[do] not suffice to stave off summary
judgme!1t

citation

. .") (interna l quotation and

omitted);

Maryland

Highways

Contractors Ass '11, Inc. v. Stale of .lI..faryland.
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I
th.t "hearsay evidence, which is inadmissible I

933 F.2d 12·16, 1251 (4th Cir. 1991 ) (noting

at trial, cannot be considered cn a morion for

summary judgment").
2.

I
I

Calhoun Decl., Ex. B.

Google objects thar Mr. Calhoun lacks

! personal

knowiedge to authenticate the

documents. See Fed. R. Evid. 901.

3.

Google objects that tbe cited evidence

Dlhoun Decl., Ex. C.

constitutes inadmissib!e hearsay_ Su Fed. R.

Evid. 801. See also Roane, 378 F. 3d at 400-

401; Maryland Highways Contractors Ass 'n.

i933 F.2d at 1251. Google further objects

I

that ' this

evidence

is

not

properly

! authenticated by the Calhoun Declaration
and lacks foundation. See fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e); Fed R. Evid. 90I(b); Colemar., 294
Fed. Appx . • t 782; see also, Williams v.
Cerberon;cs, Inc., 871 F. 2d 452, 456 (4th

!

Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiff's own'

assertions, when contradicted by substantial
evidence to the CO:1trary. are insufficient to
support

a

claim

for

employment:

!
2
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Declaration of Van Leigh in Support of Google cbjects that Iv1r. Leigh's declaration
Rosetta Stone LId.'s Motion far Partial

lacks foundation.

Summary

Stone admits that it cannot determine if a

Judgment

as

to

Liability

("Leigh Dec I."), ~ 3.

For example, Rosetta

I

product is counterfeit without physicaJ!y
inspecting it, and there is no indication that

1v1r. Leigh has performed any such inspection
of any products. See Fed. R. eiv. P. 56(e);
Fed. R. Evjd. 602; Coleman. 194 Fed. Appx . .
at 782. See alJo, Wiiliams, 871 F. 2dat 456.
5.

Declaration

of ' Jennifer Spaziana

in

Gocgle objects

to the cited deposition

Support of Rosetta Stone Ltd:s Motion

testimony as incomplete because the cited!

for Partia1 Summary Judgment as to

excerpts of testimony do not include relevant

Liability ("Spaziano

portions of Dr. Blair's testimony necessary

I

Decl."), Tab A,

3/3/10 deposition of Edward Allen Blair

for a fair understanding of his testimony and

I do

I
i

not include Dr. Blair's errata sheet. Fed.

R. Evid. 106.

Blair's

l

Additional portions of Dr.

deposition

ar! attached

to

the

Declaration ofH. Lien l as Exhibit 26.

The Lien Declaration was s!Jbmitted with Google's Opposition to Rosetta Stone' s
Motio n for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability. .

3
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6.

Spaziano

DecL,

Tab

A,

2/23110

Google objects to

the

cited deposition

I
I

deposition of Terri Chen.

testimony as incomplete. fed. R. Evid. 106.
Fairness requires that additional tes timony be
considered

contemporaneously

with

the

I

Ie-..=idr=nce
i

offered

by

Rosetta

Smne.

Additional portions of Ms. Chen's deposition
are atl.3.ched to the Declaration of H. Lien ns

I

i Exhibit 25 .

7~

Spaziano

Decl.,

Tab

A.

2126/10

Google obj::cts to the cited deposition
testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106.

deposition of Daniel Dulitz.

Fairness requires th2.t additional testimony be
considered

Ievidence
!

Additio nal

contemporaneously
offered
portions

by

with

Rosetta
of

Me.

the

Stone.

i

Dulitz's

deposition are attached to the Declaration of
H. Lien as Exhibit 26.
8.

Spaziano Dec I., Tab A, 3/4/10 deposition

Google objects to

of Baris Gultekin.

testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106.

the

cited

deposition

Fairness requires that additional (estirnony be
considered
evidence
Additional

contemporaneO'l:sly
offered
portions

by

of

with

Rosetta
Mr.

the

Stone.

Gu ltekin's

4

6490

deposition are attached to the Dec!!!.ration of

H. Lien as E¥.hibit 29.

9.

I Spaziano Decl., Tab A, 3/511 0 de~osit1on
I of Richard Holden.

Google objeots to ihe cited deposition
testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106.
Faime3s requires that additional testimony be
considered

,

ev idence

contemporaneously
offered

Additional

Rosetta

of

Mr.

the

Stone.

Holden's:

deposition are attached to the Declaration of

I

.H. Lien as Exhibit 3l.

I
10.

ponions

by

with

Spaziano

--

Decl.,

Tab

A,

2125/!O' Googlo Gbjects

to the cited deposition

testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106.

deposition ofeary Louie.

Fa irness requiies that additional testimony be
considered
evidence
Additional

co ntempo;aneously

offered
portions

by
of

with

rhe

Rosetta

Stone.

Mr.

Louie's

deposition are at1.2ched to the Declaration of

H. Lien as Exh,bit 33.
11.

r

Spaziano Decl., Tab A, 3i5/10 deposition Google objects to the cited deposition

of Rose Hagan.

testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106 .

.

Fairness requires that add itional testimony be

I

considered

colltemporeneously

with

the

i

5
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evidence

offered

Additional

by

portions

Rosetta

of

Ms.

Slone. j
Hag.,'s

deposition are attached ro dIe Declaration of
H. Lien as Exhibir 30.
12.

Spaziano

Dec!.,

T.b

A

3/10/10

deposition of Bill Lloyd.

I
I
I

the cited deposition

I

testimony a; incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106.

!

Google objects to

! Fairness requires that additional testimony be
considered

evidence

contemporaneously

offered

Additional

portions

with

Ros~rta

by
of

r.1r.

the

Stone.
Lloyd's

deposition are attached to the Declaration of

I

H. Lien.as Exhibit 32.

13.

I

I

Google objects that rhe cited evidence

Spaziano DecL, Exs. 24-27.

I

irrelevant because it relates

[0

trademarks r.ot at issue

this case, and

because

such

In

complaints

third party

by trademark

owners are not probative of actual confusion
or willfulness in the present cas'!, See, e.g..
Renaissance. Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Dollar

Tree Srores, inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 680, 697
(E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that defendant's

continued marketing of allegedly infringing

i

6
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p:OdUCiS

after

rc~ei ving

a

c~ase

and desist

letter was not orobative of bad faith).

iI Arid'"mOna IIy,

.
none

or-

t'he

d
rererence

complaints identify a single inst.ance of
I

confusion relating to the use of Rosetta
Stone's trademarks.

Allowing these third

party compiaints into evidence would be:

unduly prejudicial and confuse the jury. See

Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403; see alro,
Vukadlnovich v. antz. 995 F.2d 750, 755·56
(7th CiT.

1993) (affirming exclusion of

evidence of prior complaints and lawsuits).
Google also objects that such evidence
constitutes inadmissible hearsay and lacks
foundation. See Fed. R. Evid. 801; Roane,

378 F. 3d at 400-401; see also. Maryland
Highways Contraciors A.rs ·n, 933 F.2d at

1251.
14.

Spaziano Decl., Exs.

8~ 1

L

I

Google objects to the cited evidence because:

(I) the studies cited used multiple search
engines. not just Goog!c, so the conclusions
!

cannot be attributed to Google alone, (2)

7

6493

I

many lISers do not consider sponsored links

ads but do see them as paid fef, 2nd (3) many

users

erroneously

believe

that

website '

owners can pay Google to appear in [he
organic search resdts.

User experiences

,

i

with other sc.:rch engines and general i
perceptions of sponsoll:d fink ads have no
bearjng

on

sponso~d

how

consum~rs

perceive

links appearing on GoogJe ' s

search pages that utilize Rosetta Stone'S

I

trademarks. Trademark infringement actions

depend

on the

likelihood

of confusion

between a senior user's mark and a junior
user's use, end "detel1Tlining the likelihood

I of confusion is an <inherently factual'

I

issue

that depends on 'he facts and circumstances
Lone Star Sleakhause &

in each case."

Saloon, inc.

iI.

Alpha oj Va., Inc., 43 FJd

922,933 (4th Cir. 1995). As such, Cases in
which the "facts and circumstances" were

different tr,an the CUrrent case-<1ifferent
trademarks

were

at

issue,

different

ad,,·enisements, different products. different

8
6494

I
I

types and identities of advertisers, diffe rent

CO;tsumer expectations-have no bearing on
this

lit~gation.

These issueE render the

studies irreie'Vant znd undu ly prejudicial and
not probative as to actual confusion in this
case. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 , 4Q2. 403; see

also Vista Food Erchange. Inc. v. Vistal"
Corp., 2005 WL 2371958, at '7 (E.D.NY.
Sept. 27, 2005) (excluding survey as unfairly
prej!.ldicia! bilSed on, among other reasons,
fail ure to replicate market conditions); Simon

Prop: Group TJ'. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1033, 1052 (S.D. Ind. 2000)

(s.me).
15 .

Spaziano Decl., Exs. 12-15.

Google objects that the cited evidence is
irrelevant because the studies cited do r.ot !
test Google', 2009 policy, which permits

I only

-

I
I

u:;c of trademarks in the text of ,!

,

sponsored link adver6semems. Additionally.
this evidence is unreliable and
prejudicia1.

unduly

Moreover, as noted above,

"determining the. IikeHhoad of confus ion is

9
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an 'inherently factual' issue that depends on
the facts and circumstances in each case."

,

Lone Star Steakhollse, 43 F.3d at 933. l
Studies

in

which

different trademarks, !

Idifferent advertisements, different products, I
Idifferent types and identities of .dvertisers, I
J and

I

different consumer expectations \I..·ere at

issue ha', e no bearing on this litigation. See

i

j Fed.

R. Evid. 401, 402, 403; see also

I Objections to No.
16.

15.

Spaz iano Decl., Tab A, 3/8110 deposition

Google objects that the citcd evidence is

ofStcve Dubow.

irrclevant because Mr. Dubow did not
purchas~

the allegedly counterfeit software

through a Google sponsored link . and he

knew that he was not purchasing frorri
Rosetta Stone directly. His testimony thus is

not

probative

of

possible

consumer

confusion arising from the use of Rosetta
Stone' s

trademarks

in

connection

with

. sponsored IjP-K advertisements appearing on
Google. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402 , 403.
17. 1 Spaziano

Oed .,

Tab

A,

3112110

I

Google objects that the cited evidence

10
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I
i

,-- ,-- - - - - - - -- - - - , - - - - - - -- - -- - - _...-,
deposition of Diana Stanley Thomas.

irreie,vam

because Rosetta Stone

establish

that

Ms.

Thomas

canihJ[

I''

purchased

counterfeit software and she knew [hat she

was not purchasing from Rosetta Stone
directly.

Rosetta Stone admits that to

determine whether software is cQunterfeit
one would have to obtain the physical
product: open il, a.,d test it on a computer.

Declaration of M, Caruso2 , Ex. 53, 124:2125:7.

Rosetta Stone can,not definitively

este.blish whether Ms. Thomas" purchased I
counterfeit software because she des'"lJ'oyed
the purportedly counterfeit product Roset"ll!.

Stone

~ailed

to preserve the purportedly

I
;

counterfeit material even thcugh it had the

i

ability to do so, it knew the evidence was
!

relevant, and tt.is lawsuit was pending at the
time Ms. Thomas reported her purchase.
Because Rosetta Stone made it impo£sible to

determ ine

if she

pUTchased

c01.:mterfeit

software. her testimony should be excluded.

, The Caruso Declaration was submitted with Google's Motion for Summary Judgment.
11

649;

IMoreover,
II

any confusion that existed was I'

not caused by Googie, since Ms. Thomas's .

I tesnm~fiY suggesis [hat her purchase was

influenced by the confusing nature of the

, website from which she purchased.

See Fed.

IR. Evid. 401, 402, 403.
18.

! Spaziano Decl., Tab A, 3/9/l0 deposition I Gaogle
I of Deborah Jeffries, 31 1011 0 deposiricn of

objects that the cited evidence is

irrelevant because these witnesses testified

Rita Porter, 2nd 3/11/10 deposition of that they knew they were not purchasing

Denis Day Ie.

from Rosetta Stone directly.

Moreover,

whatever confusion existed-was not caused
by Google, since their testimony suggests
that their purchases were influene¢d by the

confusing nature of the websites from which
they purchased. See Fed.. R. Evid. 401, 402,

403.

19.

Spaziano

Oed.,

Tab

A,

9130/20041 Google objects that the probative value of

deposition of Rose Hagan. and 11l2.9/06

the

deposition of Rose Hagan.

outweighed

cited

prejudice,

testimony
by

the

is
danger

substantially
of

unfair

confusion of the issues, and

misleading the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 ,

402, 403.

This testimony was given in

12
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I! d'f'
I Lerem"

aCIJOnS,

I,

regard'mg

dl',"e,'",
l' '- t

i

trademarks and c. different Google trademark

: policy ~han is currently in place today_
Rosetta Stone also. failed to identify this prior

I, testimony

in its Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures,

Instead. Rosetta Stone made a surprise

disclosure in its tria l ::xhibit list three weeks
after the close of discovery.

Given the

cumulative nature and minimal importance
of the evidence, the Jack of any explana[ion

for the late disclosure, and the incurable
prejudice to GoogJe resulting. from the late

disclosure, the testimony is not admissible at 1

,

trial. See S. States Rack & Fixlure, Inc. v.

Sherwin,WiIliams Co" 318 F3d 592, 597
(4th Cir. 2003) (excluding testimony of a
witness disclosed on the eve of trial); Perkills

I

v, United SiDles, 626 F, Supp, 2d 587, 591 I
(E,D.
1

Va.

2009)

(excluding

witness

I

i
test imony where the propounding part'! !
failed to identify witness te..c;;tirnony in its

, Ru le 26(a) disclosures),

13
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